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I. Introduction
1Earth is a water world.
If you could look back at our planet from space, its most strik ing 
characteristic would be the dark cast of its oceans. It is these oceans which bind 
our world together. They provide the means for transportation, trade, and even 
war. Just as on land, man has competed for its control. As Sir Walter Raleigh so 
eloquently stated:
Whosoever commands the sea commands the 
trade; whosoever commands the trade of the 
world commands the riches of the world, 
and consequently the world itself.1
As competition for the seas grew, so did confrontation upon them. Countries 
soon began to realize that command of the seas not only meant an increase in 
trade and larger exploration, it meant the projection of their power and influence 
throughout the world. It was sea power that gave states the ability to conquer and 
control land at great distances. Even Alexander the Great came to recognize the 
importance of sea power: "With our own Macedonian ships and the Phoenician, 
and ... with ships from Cyprus too, we shall then have command of the sea, and 
so the conquest of Egypt will present no difficulty."2 These same principles hold 
true for the nations of today.
The United States, as an island nation, has maintained decisive control of
the seas since World War II. Recently, however, the naval superiority of the
United States has been challenged by the growing navy of its nearly land-locked
ideological opponent--the Soviet Union.
Since Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov's appointment 
as Commander-in-Chief in 1956, the Soviet Navy 
has made remarkable progress, advancing from 
littler more than a coastal defense force to one
1 Walter Raleigh as quoted from the U.S. Navy Midshipman Handbook.
2 IBID.--
2
of the world's two strongest navies.1
In the last half-century, the Soviet Union undergone a dramatic development iu 
its naval service. As Brace Watson points out, the Soviet navy has evolved from 
a "coastal defense force" to a truly blue-water fleet.2
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Today, the Soviet Union conducts naval operations throughout the world. 
At this moment, the Soviet Navy has naval assets in the Caribbean, off the east 
and west coasts of the United States, and under the polar ice caps.
Does the Soviet Union have a genuine maritime past? Why has a nation 
with a "less than glorious" 3 naval tradition ventured out onto the high seas? 
What does present doctrine and hardware suggest as to the role of the Soviet 
Navy in future conflicts? To what extent does the Soviet navy have a viable 
power projection capability? These are extremely important questions to answer 
if one is to understand the role of the sea in the global balance of power equation. 
Western military strategists have generally sought answers to these questions by
1 Peter Tsouras, "Soviet Naval Tradition." In The Soviet Navy edited by Watson, Bruce W. and 
Watson, Susan M. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), pxxiii.
2 Bruce Watson and Susan Watson, The Soviet Navy (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), 
introduction.
3 IBID .-
3analyzing available hard data on the Soviet Navy. These data include technical 
information as to ship types, classes, and weapons systems. It also includes the 
analysis of naval exercises, signal and human intelligence, and published doctrine. 
This technical analysis yields extremely valuable insights to these questions. 
However, if one only examined this "hard" data, one would be left with a simple 
one-dimensional view of the Soviet Navy. The naval service of the Soviet Union 
is a dynamic and ever-changing entity. To fully understand Soviet naval 
developments, one must examine the navy from a variety of perspectives. In 
addition to hard data analysis, one must examine the relevant nonnative values, 
attitudes, and beliefs of the people of the Soviet Union. It is only by examining 
Soviet naval culture in addition to the more traditional sources of analysis that we 
can accurately draw conclusions as to the nature of the Soviet navy.
There exists a number of potential problems of interpretation when one 
chooses to draw conclusions about an organization such as the Soviet navy. First, 
it is imperative that one keeps in mind that there exists the dialectic qualities 
inherent in large bureaucratic organizations. We must be careful in not making 
far-reaching conclusions as to the nature of something simply by analyzing "snap­
shot" data. Second, doctrinal and strategic data are very difficult to glean from a 
closed and extremely security conscious society such as the Soviet Union. 
Therefore, data may not be as complete or as well rounded as one would like. It 
is for these reasons, that one must often speculate as to the nature and 
consequences of a particular event in terms of an overall strategy.
II. Origins of the Russian Navy
4Like the Hydra's teeth, the seeds sown 
by Admiral Sergei G. Gorshkov's naval 
expansion have burst from the shipyards 
of the Soviet Union seemingly ready to 
challenge an apprehensive West on the 
high seas. Images of the technological 
and numerical strengths of today's Soviet 
Navy crowd out the subtle reality that 
this shiny new toy of the Soviet Union 
is rooted in the continua of Russian-Soviet 
history and displays inherent, perhaps 
fatal, weaknesses derived from that tradition.1
It is only by understanding a nation's past that we may have insight 
into the "why" of today. Admiral Gorshkov gives a good, although heavily 
embellished, history of the Russian navy. The Russian navy traces its roots back 
to Kievan Rus in th. 10th century. In 907 AD, Prince Oleg waged a sea 
campaign against Constantinople whereby he secured free passage for his vessels 
through the Black and Mediterranean seas.2 Gorshkov is unfailing in praise for 
the great feats of his seagoing ancestors. He quotes the English researcher, Fred 
T. Jane, who says that the Russians were "the greatest and most adventurous 
sailors of their day" and that they "had greater antiquity than the English navy."3 
Peter Tsouras, a noted security studies scholar, catches Gorshkov misleading us 
with this quote. While he does not argue that the Russians were undoubtedly the 
greatest sailors of the day, the term 'Russian' does not refer to the traditional 
Russian state. It, instead, referred to the Swedish Norse. "A Norse tribe of 
merchant adventurers, believed to have been called 'Ros,' had imposed its rule on
1 IBID., p. 3.
2 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the State (New York: Pergamon Press, 1980), p. 67.
3 IBID.-
5the disorganized Slavs, and contemporary historians were referring to these men 
and their famed seamanship when they wrote about the 'Russians.'"1
The Slavs, under Norse rule, eventually came to adopt the Norse naval 
tradition. This was a tradition of piracy and failing offensive strategy. This 
continued until the Mongol invasion of 1240-41.2 The Mongols completely 
destroyed Slavic commerce, people, and, culture. The seagoing tradition of the 
past 300 years would forever be lost.
It took Russia 2S0 years to escape from the control of the Mongol yoke. 
The Russia that survived was a rural, land-locked, weary state. It was 
surrounded by enemies and was still recovering from its 'brush with extinction.'3 
It is from this point that modem Russia developed.
Russia had its work cut out for it, if it intended to develop as a seafaring 
nation. There was nothing left of the Norse tradition. Absolutely no forward 
progress had been made in three-hundred years. In fact during the three centuries 
of Mongol rule, the primary contribution of Russia to sea power was providing 
galley slaves for service with the Turkish navy.4
Things, however, rapidly changed with the ascension to power of Peter the 
Great in the late 1600’s. Peter I was enamored by the sea and the power that it 
held.5 Peter forced his nation to build the second largest fleet in the world. He 
accomplished this feat in only twenty years-an unbelievable feat for any time. 
Peter employed both British and Dutch shipbuilders and crew to help him build 
and man this fleet. Peter’s first goal was to gain access to the sea. He looked to 
Azov to be his first step. Azov offered strategic access to the Black sea for 
Russia. By 1696, there were already enough ships built to wage a battle for
1 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 6.
2 IBID."
3 IBID."
4 Robert K. Massie, Peter the Great (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1980), pp. 85-86.
5 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 7.
6Azov.1 He was eventually able to capture Azov by a joint army and naval 
operation.2 Azov offered access for Russia to the Sea of Azov, but it was still 
separated from the Black Sea by the Kerch Strait. The Kerch strait, even though 
still under the control of Turkey, needed to be taken.3 Peter was eventually able 
to secure the straits for Russia by the intervention of ground forces. Russia was 
expanding rapidly.
This, however, was only the first step. Peter also recognized the 
importance of access to the Baltic. The Baltic was not only necessary for military 
operations, it was also vital for sea-going trade. As the Russians eventually 
were able to push their way into the Baltic, the Swedes were preparing an assault 
against them. The Russian fleet consisted of twelve battleships under sail and 
several hundred smaller vessels.-extremely impressive for the day.4 It was at the 
battle of Hango that Russia was to gamer its first naval victory. Gorshkov is 
quick to cite the decimation of the Swedish fleet by the overwhelming skill of the 
Russian navy. In reality, only a small squadron of the Swedish fleet was involved. 
They were trapped in a Finnish fjord by an overwhelming Russian fleet 
(captained mostly by Venetians and Greeks). The Russian Admiral was only able 
to defeat the Swedes by disembarking the crewmembers of his ships and using 
them as infantry on land.3 Therefore, in reality, Russia's first naval victory was 
in fact a land battle.
The land battle of Poltava in June of 1709 marked the end of Sweden as a 
great power. Gorshkov consistently relates the importance of
Hango to that of Poltava.
1 IBID."
2 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the S ta te , p. 71.
3 IBID--
4 IB ID .-
5 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 7.
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Anxious to establish the Navy's lineage and 
pride of place, Gorshkov cites Peter's equation 
of the importance of Hango with the Army's 
earlier victory at Poltava, but the two battles 
shared only an effective use of mass against 
an outnumbered enemy.1
With the death of Peter the Great came the rapid decline of the Russian 
fleet. Even Gorshkov admits that "ships became out of date and were not 
replaced in good time by new ones [and] their upkeep steadily worsened."2
The (tecline of the Soviet navy continued for thirty-seven years until the 
reign of Catherine the Great. It was Catherine who stood at the helm of "the 
Golden Age of the Russian navy." It was during this period that the Russian 
navy was at its best.
In the Russo-Turkish war of 1768-1774, Catherine ordered a Danube 
flotilla to engage the turks on the Western coast of the Black Sea. The Russian 
flotilla was <’ventually victorious against the Turkish navy.3 The Azov-Black Sea 
fleet finally succeeded in opening up the passage from Azov to the Black Sea, a 
problem since the seizure of Azov in 1696 .4 5
The next milestone in the history of the Soviet navy is the Crimean War of 
1854-1856. Even Admiral Gorshkov does not downplay the defeat of the Russian 
navy, "despite heroism shown by the Russians in this war, backward czarist 
Russia sustained a heavy defeat."3 The Black Sea fleet confronted, cornered, and 
crushed the smaller Turkish navy. Following the destruction of the Turkish 
fleet, the British and French fleets entered the war against Russia.6
1 IBID.--
2 Sergei O. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f  the S ta te , p. 73.
3 IBID."
4 IBID .-
5 IBID., p. 81.
6 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p.l 1.
8The Black Sea fleet was outmatched in every category by its Western 
adversaries. Its only saving grace was its outstanding leadership and 
aggressiveness. It would not have been able to defeat Great Britain and France, 
but it could have made thing quite difficult for them. Vice Admiral P. S. 
Nakhimov, naval commander of the Black Sea fleet, therefore, proposed that the 
Russian navy confront the enemy forces. He was, however, countermanded by 
the theatre commander, Prince Menshikov. The Russian forces were then 
delegated to coastal defense of the shore instillation at Sevastopol. Many Russian 
ships were sunk at the entrances to harbors to preclude entry by enemy vessels. 
The armaments and crews from these vessels were used to fortify land defense. 
After over a year of defending Sevastopol, the Russians were forced to surrender 
it. "Despite the skill and desperate heroism of the Russian naval forces at 
Sevastopol, their role was one that belonged to the Russian Army."1
Following the Crimean war, the Russian navy became for the first time a 
blue water fleet.2 It was now able to conduct operations away from the coastal 
areas of the homeland.
On the domestic scene, there existed no one opinion as to the missions and 
importance of this new found naval power. Nicholas II advocated a strong blue 
water fleet. He intended to use this fleet to gain territory and natural resources in 
the far east. He, however, was opposed by his advisors who were led by General 
A. N. Kiuopatkin and Count S.J. Witte. Basically, his advisors felt that the Navy 
should be used primarily as a coastal defense force. They firmly believed that 
territorial expansion should be accomplished by the use of land forces.3 In a letter 
to Tsar Nicholas, Kiuopatkin wrote, "The lessons of history have taught us to
1 IBID .-
2 IBID .-
3 IBID., p. 12.
9follow the same paths which our forefathers took, and see Russia's main force to 
be ger land army."1
Despite the lack of concensus as to the role of the navy should play in 
Russian foreign policy, Nicholas pushed forth with continued naval expansion. 
By 1900, the Russian navy was the fourth largest in terms of overall tonnage.2
The Japanese, reacting to the continued eastern expansion of the Russian 
fleet, launched a preemptive attack upon Russia by landing troops on Liaotung 
peninsula and by attacking Port Arthur.3 At first glance, it appears that the 
Japanese Navy had only a small edge over the Russian fleet. However, the 
Russian Navy lacked the proper training and professionalism at all levels that the 
Japanese possessed.4 *
In 1902, the naval staff had no war planning or 
contingency section. The former was created 
the next year but dealt primarily with the 
Baltic.3
It is for this reason that the Japanese initiative caused more damage in terms of 
confusion than by their actual damage to Russian ships.
What followed was essentially a defensive battle by the Russians to hold 
Port Arthur. The Russians sailed their ships into the port and debarked their 
crew to man the shore based artillery.6 For the second time in history, A large 
percentage of Russian sailors were to become land soldiers. The Russian fleet 
was easily destroyed while at anchor. The Russian sailors fought gallantly, but it
1 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the State , p. 12.
2 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 11.
3 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f  the S ta te , p. 86.
4 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p.l 1.
5 IBID."
6 IBID., p. 12.
10
would be in vain. The Japanese were eventually able to capture Port Arthur and 
take over 9,000 unwounded Russian sailors ,l
At this time, the Russian high-command belatedly ordered their Baltic Sea 
fleet to sail to Port Arthur and join with the remaining Pacific Squadron Their 
plan was to defeat the Japanese fleet at Port Arthur and quarantine the Japanese 
army in Manchuria. Had this decision been made earlier, the Russians would
have had a numerical edge in fleet size over the Japanese.2
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The Baltic Sea fleet was in even worse shape than its sister squadron, which 
had been easily crushed by the Japanese. Not only were the crews poorly trained, 
but they lacked adequate manpower as well.
The Baltic Sea Fleet started to move toward the Far East on October 15,
1904. They were about to embark on an unprecedented ship movement. The 
squadron did not have a single port for repair, resupply and rest.4
1 IBID.--
2 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the S ta te , p. 90.
3 IBID., p. 90.
4 IBID., p. 91.
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Eight months later, the extremely weary and ragged Russian squadron 
entered the Korean straits. The Japanese fleet had been tracking them- they 
were trained, well-rested, and prepared to strike. The battle of Tsushima will not 
quickly be forgotten.
The Second Pacific Squadron (Baltic Sea Fleet 
renamed) suffered a heavy defeat because 
the enemy surpassed it in...fighting techniques.
Most of the Russian ships were destroyed in the 
the battle and some were interned in foreign 
ports.1
Ironically, however, this battle was basically unnecessary. The Japanese Army 
was in an extremely bad situation in Manchuria at the time. Japan had exhausted 
its supply of manpower and credit.2 The Russian Army could have easily 
defeated or at least forced the rapid retreat of Japanese forces. All the Sov iets 
gained by the extensive use of their navy in this conflict was embarrassment.
The outcome of the Russo-Japanese War demonstrated the ineffectiveness 
of the Russian autocracy in managing the affairs of state.3 Domestically, Russian 
affairs were in a state of flux. It is from within this fragile political system that 
preparations for the first world war began.
The Russian Navy was virtually nonexistent following the war with Japan. 
What was left of the fleet was barely capable of sailing in open waters, much less 
confronting the German Navy. It is for this reason that Russia embarked on a 
massive rebuilding program. By 1914, Russia had built quite a large navy and 
was, in fact, stronger in the Baltic than the Germans.4 This was, however, not 
because Germany did not have the naval assets available, it was just that they were 
not willing to divert any naval resources from their sea battle with the British.
1 IBID."
2 IBID., p. 13.
3 Sergei u .  Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the S ta te , p. 94.
4 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p, 13.
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Although the Germans conducted an "economy of force" operation throughout 
the war, they continued to dominate the Russian fleet.1
The Russians believed that the Germans would use its High Seas fleet in the 
Baltic and attempt the capture of St. Petersburg.2 "This dismal conclusion acted 
as a brake on any initial aggressive action by the Russian fleet."3 The Russians 
were further inhibited by the fact that their fleet was subordinated to the Russian 
Army.4 The Russian fleet had to obtain permission from the Tsar himself every 
time they wished to get underway.5
The Russian fleet was only able to assume a defensive posture against the 
well-trained fleet of Germany. Russia had to be content with employing a mine 
warfare strategy in the Baltic.
At the start of the was the Baltic fleet set up 
a defense system including a central minefield 
position which, together with the fortifications 
of Reval and Sveaborg, became the main node of 
defense in the Baltic.6
The Russian Navy proved to be highly effective at mine warfare. 
However, the German Navy kept the Russian fleet continually on the defensive by 
repeatedly sending ships into the Russian Gulf of Riga.7 By October, 1917, the 
Germans had forced the Russians to abandon the Gulf.
By 1917, the "revolutionary fervor" of Russia had caused the disintegration 
of the Russian fleet.8 The Bolshevik revolution of November 6, 1917 further
1 Donald W. Mitchell, A History o f Russian and Soviet Sea Power (New York: Macmillan 
Publishing Company, 1974), p. 46.
2 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 13.
3 IBID.--
4 IBID. p. 73.
5 Donald W. Mitchell, A History o f Russian and Soviet Sea Pow er , pp. 282-283.
6 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the State , p. 101.
7 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 13.
8 IBID., p. 14.
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exasperated the already confused state of the Russian military. By January, 1918, 
the Russian Navy, for the second time in history, ceased to exist. The German 
opinion of the Russian fleet during World War I was characterized by the words 
of German Vice-Admiral Friedrich Ruge.1
No German officer who fought the Russians 
in 1914-1917 had any real respect for their 
fleet. It is true that the ships' crews knew 
well enough how to fire their guns and in a 
tight comer they would fight bravely to the end. 
But what the Russians had always lacked in the 
Russo-Japanese War, as well as in 1914-1918, 
was the ability to make quick decisions and to 
exploit the ever-changing tactual and 
operational opportunities inherent to war at 
sea. In the first world war, the Germans, using 
only their oldest and most poorly armed 
second-rate ships had done as the pleased 
with the Russian Baltic fleet.2
1 IBID.--
2 Friedrich Ruge, The Soviets as Naval Opponents (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute Press, 1979), 
pp. 7-8.
III. History of the Soviet Navy
14
On January 28,1918, Lenin signed into existence the Worker-Peasant Red 
Fleet. Soon following the creation of the new Soviet Red Navy, sailors were 
again made soldiers. Later that month an order from the Peoples Commissariat 
on Military affairs stated:
In connection with the formation of detatch- 
ments of the socialist army and their 
impending rapid dispatch to the front 
it is necessary to detail a platoon of 
comrade seamen to each echelon formed 
of volunteers in order to weld them 
[40 sailors per 1,000 soldiers].1
The pragmatic Lenin had learned a valuable lesson about Russian history- 
Russia's greatest threat was land, not sea based.
It took two five-year plans to once again begin to bring back the Red 
Navy.2 These five-year plans embarked upon a small shipbuilding program; 
however, in keeping with Russian naval tradition, growth in doctrine and training 
did not parallel hardware developments. Soviet leadership could force the 
Soviet people to build ships, but they could not force them to embrace a non­
existent maritime tradition. This was another example of a powerful Russian 
leader forcing a navy upon the people of his country.3
Upon Josef Stalin's ascension to power, the Red Army and Navy garnered 
increased attention within the governmental infrastructure. Stalin had a neurotic 
paranoia toward the outside world. He saw the Soviet Union as encircled by
1 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the S ta te , p. 127.
2 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 15.
3 IBID.--
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hostile powers just waiting to crush his country.1 This siege mentality is the key 
to understanding Soviet military developments during the Stalin era.
Following Lenin's death, Stalin set up a committee to govern the affairs of 
both the Red Army & Navy. Stalin virtually dominated the Committee of the 
Army while nearly ignoring the naval counterpart. This is not to say that Stalin 
did not want a strong navy, nothing could be further from the truth. Stalin 
wanted the largest navy he could afford. His motives, however, did not convey 
an understanding of sea power but, rather, a desire based upon prestige. Stalin, 
in his search for legitimacy and personal pride, sought to increase all signs of 
Soviet power.2
Following Stalin's military purges of 1937-1938, the fledgling Red Navy 
was badly crippled. Gripped with paranoia, Stalin went so far as to appoint a 
Captain in the NKVD, the infamous secret police, to the position of Commander- 
in-Chief of the Red Navy. By World War II, the Soviets had, numerically 
speaking, a world class navy. It already had the largest sub-fleet in the world 
(165 units to 956 US and 57 German).3 It was queen of the Baltic with 2 
battleships, 2 cruisers, 23 destroyers, 65 submarines, 48 torpedo boats, 39 mine 
sweepers, and 656 naval aircraft.4 5The German's again used their economy-of- 
force strategy in the Baltic and planned on fighting a mainly defensive battle with 
the Soviet Union until German land forces could take Leningrad. Germany 
prefered to concentrate the bulk of its naval assets on its battle with the Western 
allies.3
1 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institute 
Press), p. 38.
2 IBID.”
3 Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, DC: 
Governmental Printing Office, 1985), p. 3.
4 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 16.
5 IBID.-
16
Even though it had the fire-power advantage, the Soviet fleet refused to 
take the initiative, and by doing so gave the advantage to the Germans. With only 
5 submarines, 28 torpedo boats, and eighty-seven minesweepers, the Germans 
were able to sink 27 Soviet submarines at a loss of only 1 submarine and 1 
steamer. The lack of Soviet aggressiveness and training was reflected in this 
confrontation.1
Eventually, because of the failing defenses of the Soviet military, German 
land and sea forces were able to capture most of the Soviet naval bases in the 
Baltic. As Soviet installations began to fall, the bulk of the Soviet fleet 
concentrated in the port of Reval. Just prior to the fall of Reval itself into 
German hands, over 200 Soviet ships attempted to evacuate to Leningrad.2 On 
the way, Soviet forces were attacked by the German Luftwaffe. If that wasn't 
enough, the fleet steamed right into the heart of both Finnish and German 
minefields. Over 1000 lives and fifty ships were lost during this Soviet exodus.3
In a replay of Sevastopol and Port Arthur, and for the third time in 
history, the Soviet high-command ordered two-thirds of the deployed Red Navy 
to disembark and fight as ground forces. The remaining one-third of each crew 
was to man the ship's guns. All in all, 83000 officers and men fought as land 
troops during World War II.This was the Soviet fleet's greatest contribution to 
the war.4
World War II was a continental war with land oriented goals. The Soviet 
fleet played only a minor role in the overall tactical situation. The significance, 
however, of Worlj War II to the Soviet Navy was primarily its psychological 
impact upon the people of the USSR. Over one-third of the territory of the
1 IBID.-
2 IBID., p. 17.
3 IBID., p. 16.
4 IBID .-
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Soviet Union was overrun by enemy forces. One third of the population, 20
million people, were killed as a direct result of the war. The Great Patriotic
War, as it is known in the Soviet Union, will never be forgotten by the Soviet
people. The Great Patriotic War is the single greatest contributor to the Soviet
obsession with the security of the homeland.
The chief lesson of the Great Patriotic War 
is that it is essential to mbuff any aggressive 
pretensions decisively and in good time and 
fight against war before it begins. This is 
particularly topical now when international 
imperialism headed by the United States 
is basing its foreign policy on military 
strength and attempting to gain superiority 
over socialist countries.1
Following the War, the Soviet Union tried to gain influence and control in 
Eastern Europe. Its goal was to create a buffer of either pro-Soviet of Soviet- 
satellite states to surround the homeland. The Soviet Union was determined to 
not allow a repeat of WWII. However, the United States and Roosevelt had 
already conceded enough territory and influence to Stalin at Yalta-the United 
States was going to stand fast in curtailing any new expansion of the Soviet 
empire. Already in 1946, East - West tensions began to grow. Stalin was 
convinced of the inherent hostility of Capitalism toward communism.2
Stalin's greatest fear of the West stemmed from the fact that the United 
States was in sole possession of the greatest destructive power yet known to man- 
the nuclear bomb. The Cold War formally began in 1949 when the U.S. helped 
form NATO to counter future Soviet expansion.3 The United States had suddenly 
become the prime adversary of the Soviet Union.
1 Editorial in Pravda, 20 June 1988.
2 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 18.
3 IBID .-
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The use of nuclear weapons by the United States against Japan profoundly
affected Soviet military thought. In the past, following an armed conflict,
military theoreticians would choose weapon systems on the basis of performance
and effectiveness during the war.1 The U.S. possession of the bomb caused a state
of confusion among Soviet military officials.2 As Fleet Admiral Gorshkov stated:
The minds of many military specialists 
were exercised by the problems of the 
status of the fleet in conditions of a nuclear 
war and the influence of nuclear weapons 
on the construction of ships, their viability 
arming, and other tactical qualities. [...] There 
was a tendency...to deny the possibilities 
of the fleets in conditions where nuclear 
weapons would be used.3
As a direct result of this confusion, the Soviet fleet suffered. There would be no 
building program for the fleet for ten more years.4
As the Cold War grew hotter, and the Soviets were able to develop a bomb
of their own, the world began to use the term Nuclear War for the first time.
Its [the Cold War] transformation into 
actual hostilities involving the new weapons 
of mass destruction now possessed by both 
sides seemed more than likely as long as 
an increasingly megalomaniac Stalin ruled 
the Soviet Union.5
A new era began with the death of Stalin and the ascension to power of 
Nikita Khrushchev. In 1956 at the 20th party congress, Khrushchev gave his 
famous "secret speech" which denounced Stalin's paranoic and defensive view of 
the homeland and its relationship within the world state system. 6 Khrushchev
1 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f  the S ta te , p. 158.
2 IBID .-
3 IBID.--
4 m i D -
5 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, p. 38 & 39.
6 IBID., p. 39.
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proposed a new system of 'peaceful coexistence' based upon military and 
economic parity with the West. East-West competition, said Khrushchev, would 
be carried out not on the battlefield but rather on the world economy. 
Khrushchev predicted that the Soviet Union would surpass the United States as the 
leader of the world economy in twenty years.
A new era also began for the Red Navy during Khruschev's term in the 
Kremlin. In 1956, Nikita Khrushchev appointed Admiral Sergei Gorshkov as the 
Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet Navy. Gorshkov saw the Navy as the key to 
making the Soviet Union a super-power. He advocated the production of a well 
balanced blue-water fleet capable of supporting state interests anywhere on the 
world's oceans.
Khrushchev, however, constrained by economic and political factors,
advocated a smaller fleet which could adequately counter the threat of U.S.
ballistic missiles. The United States and NATO already had a huge lead in all
aspects of naval hardware and tactics. The Soviets felt that something had to be
done quickly to alleviate the threat of the Western navies. It is for this reason
that the Soviet Union embarked upon a massive submarine building campaign.
In the words of Admiral Gorshkov:
The priority given to the development of the 
forces made it possible in a very short time 
to increase sharply the strike possibilities of 
our fleet, to form a considerable counter balance 
to the main forces of the fleet of the enemy 
in the oceanic theaters, and at the cost of 
fewer resources and less time, to multiply 
the growth of seapower of our country, 
thereby depriving an enemy of the advantages 
which could accrue to him in the even of war 
against the Soviet Union and the countries of 
the Socialist community.1
1 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the State , p.190.
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The importance that the Soviets gave to submarine production again points 
to the defensive and reactionary nature of Soviet naval development. As 
Marshall V.D. Sokolovskiy, Chief of the General Staff from 1952-59, writes, 
"Simultaneously with the Strategic Rocket Forces, the main force keeping him 
[the U.S.] in check and decisively defeating him in war is the nuclear rocket 
carrying submarine fleet."
As the Soviets became more and more enamored with the submarine as
their newest weapon of choice, they began (much to the chagrin of Gorshkov), to
downplay the importance of what they termed 'large, vulnerable surface craft.'1
The waging of military operations based on 
large formations of surface ships will 
disappear from the scene, together with 
surface ships themselves. In a future 
war, the task of destroying shore targets 
or defeating groupings of the naval forces 
of an aggression, or his assault carrier 
formations and rocket carrying submarines 
at bases or on the high seas and the disruption 
of ocean communications will be accomplished 
by ... the mobile operations of rocket carrying 
submarines.2
The Soviet Navy had evolved much differently than its U.S. counterpart. The 
Soviet Navy in the fifties and early sixties had been designed | m imarily to deter 
NATO during peacetime, and sea-line-of-communication interdiction during 
hostilities. As the Soviets would soon find out, Admiral Gorshkov had been 
right.
In 1962, President of the United States, John F. Kennedy, addressed the 
nation:
Good evening, my fellow citizens. The 
government, as promised, has maintained
1 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, p. 38.
2 Sokolovskiy, Quoted from Ranft & Till
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the closest surveillance of the Soviet military 
buildup on the island of Cuba. Within the 
past week, unmistakable evidence has 
established the fact that a series of offensive 
missile sites is now in preparation on that 
imprisoned island. The purpose of these 
bases can be none other than to provide a 
nuclear strike capability against the 
Western hemisphere.1
With that speech to the nation the President was putting into motion a series of 
events which would forever change the nature of the Soviet Navy.
The Soviet love affair with its boomers, SSBNs, was soon about to be 
shattered. In 1962, President Kennedy challenged Khrushchov to remove his 
nuclear missiles from Cuba. Kennedy then ordered U.S. naval forces to create a 
naval quarantine around Cuba. The CNO dispatched a number of larger surface 
combatants to accomplish the task. The Soviet Union was in a unenviable 
position. It was faced with a confrontation situation with the United States and 
the only the military service it could rely upon was the Red Navy. While the 
Soviets had plenty of submarines in the area, they did not possess the surface 
combatants necessary to challenge the United States. Khrushchev tried to send his 
unarmed merchantmen through the blockade. They could not run the blockade 
and turned around in humiliation.2 Gorshkov was right, without a balanced 
fleet, the Soviet Union would be unable to "up the anty" during a confrontation 
with a superior surface fleet.
Not a shot was fired between the two 
navies in the Caribbean, yet the Soviet 
Navy's glaring demonstration of impotence 
in the face of U.S. sea power was probably 
more damaging to its prestige and self-image
1 John F. Kennedy quoted from his television address to the nation.
2 Peter Tsouras, Soviet Naval Tradition, p. 19.
than a lost battle.1
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For the sixth time in its history, the Soviet Union had faced major embarrassment 
at sea.
Along with the overthrow of Nikita Khrushchev and his "all or nothing" 
strategy came the new concept of "flexible response."2 This concept embraced 
the ability of a nation to use its forces in a limited crises response mode. The 
Soviets had learned their lesson with Cuba.
It was the recognition that although one resides in a nuclear world, nuclear 
weapons do not provide the only method of deterrence or that any future war 
will be nuclear.3 "Soviet-Military theoretical thought repudiates notions about 
nuclear missile forces as 'absolute weaponry."4 It is upon this concept that the 
Red Navy began to build a balanced fleet capable of sea interdiction 
in a v a r i e t y  o f  r o l e s  a n y w h e r e  at  s ea .
1 1BID."
2 George E. Hudson, "Soviet Naval Doctrine, 1953-1972," in Soviet Naval Developments edited 
by Michael MccGwire (NY, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 285.
3 IB ID .-
4 Lt. Col A. Volkov and L t Col N. Zapara, "Nauchnotekhnicheskaia revoliutsiia i voennoe delo,” 
Kommunitt vooruzhennykhsil No. 2, January 1971, p. 12.

IV. Geographic Limitations
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As Alfred Thayer Mahan points out, it is a states geographical position, 
physical conformation, extent of territory, and naval tradition which make up the 
principal conditions which, together, combine to influence the relative 
"'nrtance of sea power within a nation.1 The Soviet Union has always been 
limited by severe geographical hindrances. Throughout Russian history, access to 
warm water ports has always been something that had to be fought for.
The Soviet Union has a coastline extending more than 25,000 miles. 
Unfortunately, at any one time, up to 90% of Soviet shoreline can be either ice- 
locked or riddled with so much ice, it makes the use of ships impossible.2
The Navy of the Soviet Union is spread out over four oceans. This means 
that the Soviet Union faces an ever-challenging barrier to resupply and 
coordinate its forces.3 To complicate matters further, the Soviet fleet is 
imprisoned by a series of geographic choke points.
The Soviet Union also faces severe climactic limitations. Three of the four 
Soviet fleets reside in areas adjacent to or above the arctic circle. This means the 
the Soviet fleet is constantly forced to engage in cold-water operations.4
The Northern Fleet is stationed in the Murmansk-Severomorsk-Polyamy 
area. This area lies above the arctic circle and is characterized by severe cold 
and extremely hazardous ice-flows.5
1 Alfed Thayer Mahan, The Influence o f  Sea Power Upon History (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: 
Prentice Hall, 1964), p. 33.
2 Edward Wegener, The Soviet Naval Offensive, (Annapolis, MD: Naval Institure Press, 1974), 
p. 17.
3 Michael A. Schoelwer, "Geographic Problems," In The Soviet Navy edited by Watson, Bruce 
W. and Watson, Susan M. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 177.
4 IBID."
5 IBID.-
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ubmarines bound for the Norwegian Sea must pass through a section of 
sh llo vv water that is generally less than 120 meters deep.1 Western anti- 
subm rinc warfare (ASW) ships can easily prosecute Soviet Submarines in this 
a ea also alio' s NATO to assig Westei i ast-attack submarines to trail 
S( 'ie, omer
/another choke-point awaits the Soviet fleet at the Southern tip of the 
Norwegian Sea. Here Soviet assets must pass through the bulk of NATO's 
defenses. This area is known as the Greenland-Iceland-United-Kingdom (GIUK) 
gap. It is the primary area in which Western fleets hope to bottle-up Soviet 
forces.2
The Northern fleet is again hindered by Western chokepoints when they 
attempt to transit the Mediterranean Sea. They are forced to pass through the 
Strait of Gibraltar and the Strait of Sicily.3
The Soviets only warm water port is the home of the Black Sea fleet. The 
Black Sea area has an ideal climate in which to conduct naval operations. 
However, the downfall of this port is its untenable strategic position. In order to 
exit the Black Sea, the fleet must transit through the 180 mile-wide Turkish 
Straits. Not only do these straits represent a large area of vulnerability to the 
Soviet fleet in terms of geographical strategy, they also mandate a legal liability. 
The straits, owned by Turkey, are governed by the 1936 Montreaux Convention. 
This convention forces the the USSR to notify Turkey eight days prior to any 
ship transit. It also prohibits any Soviet submarines from transiting the area 
unless they are returning for maintenance or repairs.4
1 IBID., p. 178.
2 IBID-
3 IBID .-
4 IBID., p. 179.
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After exiting the Turicish Straits, the Black Sea Fleet is forced to navigate 
an extremely narrow passage in the Dardanelles until they enter the Sea of 
Marmara.1 This offers the U.S. Sixth Fleet another opportunity to bottle-up the 
Soviet fleet.
The Baltic Fleet is confronted with severe climactic limitations. Dm ring the 
winter, from 25-50% of the sea area is frozen.2. Geographically, the Baltic Fleet 
is limited by the Baltic Straits, controlled by Denmark and Sweden. These straits 
have only one negotiable passage for large ships-the Great Belt.3 The Great Belt 
lies within Danish territorial waters and is only 12 miles wide.4 5
Pacific Fleet is faced with the all-around harshest circumstances.3 
Geographically, the fleet is faced with a multitude of narrow straits. The Pacific 
Fleet naval instillation is located on the Sea of Japan. On the way to the Pacific 
Ocean, the fleet must first transit the Tartar Strait, the La Perouse Strait, and the 
Kunashir Strait. A second route for the Pacific fleet is through the Tsugaru 
Strait (less than 25 miles wide). The final route to the Pacific is through the 
Tsushima Strait, which is less than 110 miles wide.6
However bad the geographic restrictions may be for the Pacific Fleet, it is 
the extremely long resupply route which is its largest limitation. It is the 5, 778 
mile long Trans-Siberian railroad which provides almost all supplies to the 
Pacific Fleet. This route passes extremely close to China and would be extremely 
vulnerable to attack during hostilities.7
1IBED.--
2 IBID., p. 178.
3 IBID., p. 179.
4 DHD.--
5 IBID., p. 180.
6 IBID.-
7 IBID.-
Mahan would not view the Soviet Union as a true maritime nation. It 
faces extreme geographical and historical problems. Why, then, has the Soviet
U n i 0 n b u i , t a l a r g e n a v y ?
27
a
V. Understanding Soviet Naval 
Develc pment
28
The Russian Navy has had extremely shaky origins. It has underlying 
themes of mischief and imperialism. It started with an adopted Norse tradition, 
evolved with Western leadership, and expanded only due to the strong-armed will 
of its leaders. Russia is a land-oriented power with a forced maritime tradition. 
It is only due to the historical strength of Russian and Soviet leaders that the 
Soviet Navy has developed.
We have seen the Russian Navy suffer on each occasion where it tried to 
confront true maritime nations. In almost every occasion, when the navy was 
failing, the Russian fleet was disembarked and turned into a land-based force. 
Why, then, has the Soviet Union continued to develop its fleet?
There are three basic concepts which create the Soviet mindset and shape 
its goals. These are the ingrained attitudes of Slavic culture, the accepted lessons 
of Russian history, and the requirements of Marxist-Leninist ideology.1
1 Capt William Manthorpe, "The Influence of Being Russian On the Officers and Men of the 
Soviet Navy," U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings 104 (May 1978): 133.
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Eastern Slavic civilization has long removed itself from the West, while 
simultaneously relying upon the West for infusions of political ideas and 
technology. This has caused an "unstable alternation between feelings of 
chauvinistic pride and feelings of inferiority."1
Marxism-Leninism envisions a world of class struggle between two 
antagonistic and irreconcilable social, political, and economic systems. This 
ideological imperatives drive the Soviet Union to engage in an a adversarial 
relationship with the West. It also causes the Soviet Union to feel a need to 
demonstrate the might and progress of the Red Navy.2
In addition to the Soviet obsession with security and its ideological 
commitment to the tenets of Communism, a large fleet can be used to project 
Soviet power and influence throughout the world. Basically, the Soviets plan to 
use their navy to protect state interests throughout the world. Their first priority 
is the protection of Soviet assets, both personnel and hardware. Second, the 
So lets will use their naval assets to protect their clients from both internal and 
external threats. Finally, the Soviets will use their navy to increase potential 
relationships with non-clients.3 These are inherent desires for a super-power in 
the twentieth-century. In other words, a world class navy is a necessity for a 
super-power in the twentieth-century.
It is the Soviets congruence with historical lessons, ideological 
imperatives, and super-power status, that explain why the Soviet Union has 
forced the development of a blue-water fleet.4
1 IBID. -
2 IBID -
3 Robert C. Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Nayy," in Soviet Naval 
Developments edited by Michael MccGwiie (NY, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p 301.
4 Manthorpe, Capt W.H. ‘The Influence of Being Russian or the Officers and Men of the Soviet 
Navy’, in USNI Proceedings.
It has been in the last three decau
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it the Soviet Navy has expanded from
a primarily coastal defense force to a v\ iy powerful oceangoing fleet capable of
p e r f o r mi n g  a ful l  s pe c t r um of  nava l  mi s s i ons .
VI. Missions of the Red Navy
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Admiral Gorshkov, in the Soviet M ilitary Encyclopedia, enumerates the
missions of the Soviet Navy when he says the navy is:
the branch of the armed forces intended 
to carry out strategic and operational 
missions in the sea and ocean theaters 
of combat capabilities. Today’s navy is 
capable of delivering strikes by its strategic 
nuclear forces against important enemy 
ground targets, of destroying his naval 
forces at sea and on their bases, of 
disrupting enemy ocean and sea 
communication, and protecting our own 
sea communications.1
To sum up, then, the Soviet Union defines its naval missions as strategic 
defense and offense, support of ground forces, interdiction of sea-lines of 
communication, and support of state policy.2
In the modem era, the primary mission of the Soviet Navy is to protect the 
homeland from foreign attack. Soviet Naval development has been shaped by the 
Soviet interpretation of the Western threat posed to it by the navies of NATO. 
The largest threat posed by the West to the Soviets is the Western strategic strike 
capability. It is for this reason that strategic defense is the primary mission of the 
Soviet Navy. As Marshall Sokolvskiy wrote “the first priority of naval 
operations in the oceanic and sea theaters will be the destruction of Atomic 
missile submarines.’’3 As Admiral Gorshkov pointed out:
1 ADM Sergei Gorshkov quoted in, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments (Washington, DC: 
Governmental Printing Office, 1985), p. 3.
2 Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p. 12.
3 Robert G. Weinland, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy,” in Soviet Naval 
Developments, p. 294.
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The imperialists are turning the worlds 
oceans into an extensive launching pad... 
of ballistic missiles, of submarines, and 
carrier aviation trained on the Soviet Union 
and the countries of the socialist community 
and our navy must be capable of standing 
up to this real threat.1
The Soviet Navy seeks to accomplish this mission in two ways. First, the 
Soviet fleet employs ASW assets to destroy Western ballistic missile submarines 
(SSBN’s). Second, the Soviets employ their own fleet of boomers to act in a 
strategic deterrence role.
The first sea based nuclear threat posed to the USSR was the Polaris 
submarine. By 1960, the first Polaris submarine, the USS George Washington, 
was on deployment with 16 Polaris A-l missiles.2
The Soviets hoped to counter the Polaris by establishing sea control in a 
far-zone, equal to the range of the A-l missile, around the Soviet mainland.3 
Basically, they intended to keep the US subs more than 1200 miles from shore 
(the A-l had a 1200 mile range).
In 1967, the Soviets reacted to the US development of the extended range 
A-2 SLBM (2000 mile range) by extending the far zone to 25000 miles.4 The 
ever-increasing weapon ranges of the Western SLBM’s were drawing the 
defensive curtain of Soviet forces farther and farther out to sea.
Currently, the main western submarine threats are posed by the U.S. 
Lafayette, Benjamin Franklin, James Madison, and Ohio class ballistic missile 
submarines. They are currently equipped with the Trident 1 SLBM with an
1 Sergei G. Gorshkov, Sea Power o f the S ta te , p. 279.
2 Lawrence P. Larson "Antisubmarine Warfare," In The Soviet Nuvy edited by Watson, Bruce 
W. and Watson, Susan M. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986),p. 137.
3 IBID.--
4 IB ID .-
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effective inertial guidance range of approximately 7400 Km.1 The Soviet zone- 
oriented defense would no longer be adequate to defeat the US SSBN’s. The 
Soviet’s knew they had develop a true ASW capability.
The Soviets also hope to destroy US hunter-killer subs (SSN). They hope 
to target US Permits, Sturgeons, and mainly Los Angeles fast attacks. By 
countering US SSN’s, the Soviets hope to increase the survivability of their 
SSBN’s and ASW forces.
Anti-submarine forces currently comprise the largest class of surface 
combatant in the fleet arsenal. It is ships such as the Kresta II, Kara, Moskva, 
Kirov, and the (Jdaloy that are designed to undertake the ASW mission for the 
Red Navy. Just as in the US Navy, fast attack submarines are the best ASW 
platform. They can move undetected between thermal layers and can use 
advanced passive sensors to detect enemy subs. In 1985, the Soviets deployed the 
extremely quiet Akula class sub. They have also recently deployed the Sierra 
class SSN.
Soviet exercises since 1973 have heavily emphasized the ASW role of the 
Soviet fleet. In Vesna-75, Okean 70 & 75, and Rimpac, the primary theme has 
been the destruction of US SSBN’s with the destruction of US hunter-killers as a 
secondary mission.2
On the surface side, the Soviets are continually expanding their ASW 
platforms to meet new threats and evolve with new technology. The Soviet’s 
have just deployed their first true aircraft carrier—the Tbilisi class. This is a 
65,000 metric ton carrier which will have an air wing complement of YAK-41 
VSTOL fighter, and the Su-27 Flanker.3 While the carrier will be used as a 
platform for ASW helos and aircraft, its primary mission will be to provide air
1 Janes' Fighting Ships 1988-1989 (NY, NY: JFS Publishing Company, 1988), p. 695.
2 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, p. 165.
3 Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p.78.
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cover for Soviet ASW or ASuW away from the homeland. This will allow the 
Red Navy to prosecute US SSBN’s at a greater range than is nresently possible 
due to air-cover limitations. Along with the newer Kirov CON, Moskva CHG, 
and Udaloy DDG class ships, the Soviets have what appears to be a formidable 
ASW fleet. The Red Navy has unquestionably deployed a modem, capable ASW 
fleet; however, US submarine technology is still sufficient to defeat their ASW 
efforts.
The Soviets also hope to counter the US surface nuclear threat. It is the IS 
US carriers and their battlegroups (CVBG), in eight different classes, which pose 
this surface-based strategic threat. The greatest threat from the carrier being the 
18 1 /A Hornets, and the 20 A-6E Intruders—each aircraft capable of delivering 
nuclear ordinance.
The Soviets plan on using a combination of SSN’s. surface combatants, and 
sea and air based aircraft to prosecute the carrier battle-group,CVBG, and 
destroy the carrier.
Current Soviet doctrine calls for strike aircraft to be preceded by Bear D 
reconnaissance aircraft to provide over the horizon targeting information to the 
surface, air, and sub fleet. Strike aircraft would first be used to weaken the 
defenses of the carrier. Immediately following the air attack, surface and 
subsurface craft would launch their surface to surface or cruise missiles 
simultaneously. The strategy being that the overwhelming number of incoming 
threats would confuse the US chain-of-command and its weapon systems.1
In Okean (19)70, a fleet of over 100 Soviet combatants conducted 
simulated anticarrier warfare in the Northern Atlantic. The simulated CVBG 
was subjugated to the attack of 10 surface ships, 30 submarines, and more than
1 Scott L. Nicholas, "The Changing Mission Structure o f the Soviet Navy," in Soviet Naval 
Developments edited by Michael MccGwire (NY, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1970), p. 143.
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400 sorties or aircraft. Five years later, in Okean 75, the same exercise was 
expanded to include locating the CVBG by the use of aircraft, ships, and 
satellites.1
The biggest single asset the Red Navy can use to prosecute US carriers are 
its SSN’s. Soviet fast .tack subs have the capability to attack with torpedoes; 
however, cruise missiles are the weapon of choice. The new SS-N-21 has a range 
of 1100 NM (if it has OTH targeting information).2
In the past, Soviet SSN’s were not very effective. The US had the ability to 
detect incoming enemy SSN’s and destroy them before they could pose a threat to 
the carrier. With the advent of nuclear submarines, on station submerged time 
was increased twenty fold. Most Soviet subs are still noisy, but now they can sit 
quietly and wait for the carrier to come to them. Soviet SSN’s are virtually 
noiseless when not making way. The SSN just needs to wait until the carrier is 
within targeting range and then fire.
The second threat posed by the USSR toward US CVBG’s is surface based. 
The new Tbilsi carrier could provide air cover for an attacking force of Kiev, 
Kirov, Moskva, and Slava class ships. Again, the Soviets intend to overwhelm the 
defenses of US vessels. Soviet combatants have far more weapon systems on each 
ship. After the initial salvo is fired; however, most Soviet ships have no reload 
capability. This suggests that they were designed to operate in a very quick 
confrontation with an enemy. This makes sense in light of the Soviet ‘overwhelm 
and confuse’ strategy. Red Navy combatants, with their superior instantaneous 
fire-power, hope to quickly destroy the carrier and its battlegroup.
1 IBID.~
2 Janes' Fighting Ships 1988-1989 (NY, NY: JFS Publishing Company, 1988), p. 545.
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The final asset the Soviets will use to counter the US carrier threat is Soviet 
Naval Aviation. The use of Backfire and Badger bombers negate the ability of 
US carriers to operate unchallenged in the European and Asian theaters. Now, 
with the completion of the Blackjack bomber, the threat to US battlegroups will 
increase dramatically. The range of the Blackjack is significantly greater than 
that of the Backfire.1
Current Soviet thought is edging closer to sea-based nuclear escalation. 
The navy is considering using its Yankee 1 & II SSBN’s with their SS-N-6 
SLBM’s to ‘sanitize’ known US SSBN operating area.2 These missiles could also 
be used to wipe out US CV battle groups.
Of equal importance with the strategic defense mission is the Soviet Navy’s 
strategic strike capability. Gorshkov exhorted the importance of Soviet SSBN’s 
in Izvestiya in 1966, “Nuclear powered submarines equipped with ballistic 
missiles have now become the main force of the navy.”3 Over 40% of Soviet ship 
construction since 1966 has been in the building of ballistic missile submarines.4 
Currently, the Soviet Navy has Typhoon, Deha I-IV, Yankee I & II, Hotel III, 
and Golf II & V classes deployed.
One significant drawback to the Soviet dependence upon their SSBN’s has 
been the technological lead the West has in ASW technology. US sea and air 
based ASW forces can effectively prosecute Soviet SSBN’s. It is for this reason 
that Soviet SSBN’s must operate in conjunction with surface combatants. The 
Soviets are forced to devote a significant portion of their fleet to protect their 
strategic subs from Western ASW forces. It follows, then, that Soviet SSBN’s 
tend to operate near its coast where its fleet can maintain decisive sea control.
1 Scott L. Nicholas, "The Changing Mission Structure of the Soviet Navy," in Soviet Naval 
D evelopm ents, p. 147.
2 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy , p. 163.
3 Gorshkov quoted in Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy , p. 167.
4 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, p. 167.
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This ‘bastion’ concept forces US forces to maintain a forward deployment to 
counter USSR SSBN’s. More and more, however, Soviet SSBN’s are being 
designed to operate under the polar ice. By doing this, the Red Navy is able to 
effectively neutralize the Western ASW edge.
Support of Ground forces is the third major mission of the Red Navy. The
Soviet Navy is tasked to protect the Army’s seaward flank from assault from
enemy naval forces, seize and control forward land assets, and provide naval
gunfire support (NGFS) and supplies for ground operations. The US Department
of Defense believes that sea support of the Soviet Army will:
be principally in the Baltic and Black Sea 
and would be designed primarily to obtain 
control of the Danish and Turkish Straits.
Assaults against Northern Norway and 
the Japanese Straits would also be conducted.1
To accomplish these missions the Red Navy will rely upon several assets. Ship-
borne support will primarily come from the Soviet Sverdlov CG’s with its 12
inch guns. Also the Soviets plan to use their submarines with short range ballistic
missiles to support the ground war. In 1976, for example, the Soviets assigned
six Golf II and four Juliett SSB’s to fufill this mission in the Baltic.2
The primary method, however, of Soviet Naval support to ground 
operations is its use of naval amphibious capabilities. Soviet amphibious 
capabilities can be used anywhere throughout the world. Marshall Sokolvskiy 
saw this mission as indicating that, “The fleet w ill... have the task of carrying out 
landings on the enemy’s coast, and safeguarding the crossing of straits and large 
water obstacles by the land forces.”3
1 Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p. 15.
2 IBID .-
3 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, p. 176.
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It was following the Cuban Missile crisis that the Naval Infantry was
reactivated. Before that time, the presence of nuclear weapons had caused a
mindset which downgraded the importance of conventional warfare. As Admiral
Stalbo, one of the greatest Soviet strategists, wrote in 1970:
We would stress that the basic reasons which 
forced the warring 3ides to resort to amphibious 
landings [in the Second World War] have not only 
been maintained under modem conditions, 
but have been considerably enhanced. Because 
of this, amphibious landings have not lost their 
importance to the slightest degree.1
Currently, there are approximately 14, 000 men in the Naval Infantry. 
There are three Naval Infantry brigades, and a division of three regiments. The 
three brigades are distributed equally among the fleets, with the Pacific fleet 
receiving the division.2
Naval Infantry landings fall into four categories, strategic, operational, 
tactical, or special. For operational and strategic landings, the Naval Infantry 
would be the first wave of a landing force. The mission would be to secure the 
beachhead for the landing of ground forces.3
The second type of mission that the Naval Infantry could perform would be 
tactical. In a tactical landing, a company or regiment would be assigned a 
specific task to accomplish. Operations might include headquarters destruction, 
destruction of a radar instillation, etc...4
1 Stalbo quoted in Bryan Ran ft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy, p. 176.
2 Michael J. O ’Hara, "Naval Infantry," In The Soviet Navy edited by Watson, Bruce W. and 
Watson, Susan M. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 48.
3 IBID .-
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The Naval Infantry has taken part in a number of training exercises which 
demonstrate their possible future role during hostilities. In Exercise Sever in 
1968, the naval Infantry landed troops on the Rybachiy Peninsula. They 
conducted an amphibious landing along with Polish and East German Amphibious 
forces. In 1969, the Soviet Naval Infantry conducted operation Oder-Neisse. 
During this operation, the Soviets landed a Warsaw Pact brigade on the coast of 
Poland. Okean-70 saw the Soviets conduct simultaneous amphibious landings in 
all four fleet areas. Later on in 1970, during the Comrades-in-Arms exercise 
another Polish-East German-Soviet landing took place. The final amphibious 
exercise was Comrades-in-Arms 80. This time a large scale landing on the E. 
German island of Rugen took place. Backfire bombers and Mi-24 Hinds were 
used to provide realistic air-support for this exercise.* 1
1 IBID .-
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We can draw several conclusions as to the nature of the Soviet Naval 
Infantry on the basis of these exercises. First, there was a steady progression in 
complexity from Sever in 1968 to Comrades-in-Arms in 1980. Two, these 
exercises showed a expected use of nuclear weapons.1 In Okean-70, for example, 
a Baltic landing was only started after the enemy had been assaulted with nuclear 
weapons.* 2 Three, the Naval Infantry employes antilanding defense in addition to 
their own landing operations. Fourth, all of these exercises were limited in 
amount of resources, length of operation, and range of options.3 In addition, all 
of these operations were conducted within the range of land-based air-support 
and supply capability. These operations seem to be modernized versions of the 
“localized and limited landing operations” that the Soviet Union conducted in 
World War II.4 These operations appear to indicate that the Soviet Union does 
not intend to use their naval infantry far from the homeland.
The primary missions of the naval Infantry will be to first support the 
ground forces and then overcome the severe geographic hindrances of the Soviet 
fleet by gaining control of vulnerable choke-points.
The Pacific Fleet’s Naval Infantry will attempt to seize La Perouse Strait. 
This strait divides the Soviet Sakhalin from Japan’s Hokkaido island and gives 
access to the Pacific Ocean. The Baltic Fleet will attempt to gain control of the 
Danish Straits. It is this battle that the Naval Infantry has been practicing since 
Operation Sever. The Black Sea Naval Infantry will attempt to seize and control 
the Bosporus and Dardanelles straits. Hie Naval Infantry Brigade stationed with 
the Northern Fleet would be tasked to destroy the ports and airfields in Northern 
Norway-thereby denying NATO access to important port facilities.3
1 IBID."
2 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey Till, The Sea in Soviet Strategy , p. 178.
3 Michael J. O ’Hara, "Naval Infantry," In The Soviet Navy pp 32-33.
4 Bryan Ranft and Geoffrey TUI, The Sea in Soviet Strategy , p. 178.
3 Michael J. O ’Hara, "Naval Infantry," In The Soviet Navy pp 32-33.
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The Naval Infantry is limited in its power projection role by the relatively 
small size of the navy’s amphibious fleet. Again, this suggests that the Red Navy 
plans on using the Naval Infantry in areas close to the USSR.
There appear to be several explanations as to why the Soviet Navy has not 
expanded its Naval Infantry. First, the government is very weary of committing 
troops to a conflict without the assurance of victory. Second, the Naval Infantry 
is deficient in three areas: sir support, amphibious lift, and sustainability. Also, 
as was discussed earlier, the Soviets are restrained by their ingrained attitudes 
toward the sea, a product of Russian history and psychology. Finally, the Soviets 
appear to be reluctant to commit forces away from the homeland. The USSR is 
weary of getting involved in another Afghanistan.1 2 It is for this reason that a 
true power projection capability of the Red Navy in areas distant from the Soviet 
Union has been downplayed.
1 Janes' Fighting Ships 1988-1989 (NY, NY: JFS Publishing Company. 1988), p. 54.V
2 IBID., p. S3.
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In 1989, however, the Soviets completed die construction of their first true
aircraft carrier, the Lenoid Brezhnev and scholars began to reassess the power
projection capability the Soviet Navy.
Carriers are the natural platforms for 
power projection because they are by far 
the most efficient means by which a navy 
can project explosives at high speed over 
considerable distances. The reason is that 
the carriers of the explosives, the airplanes, 
are reusable.1
To understand the significance of a carrier to Soviet strategy one must 
examine current capabilities and their relation to an overall strategy.
The Soviets have a very weak amphibious and underway replenishment
force compared to that of the US. In addition,
certain shipbuilding programs related to 
power projection (Such as the Berezina 
class underway replenishment ship 
and the Ivan Rogov class heavy lift vessel) 
were either curtailed or cancelled. The Soviets 
have continued with production of a class 
of large-deck aircraft carriers, but the design 
has been scaled back from original plans for 
use of catapults and high-performance aircraft 
to older VSTOL models. The primary mission of 
these carriers in any event may be less power 
projection than sea control and ASW.2
1 IBID .-
2 Francis Fukyama, “Soviet Civil-Military Relations and the Power Projection Mission,” (Santa 
Minica, CA :The Rand Corporation, 1987), p. vii.
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If the Soviet Navy was not designed for a global power projection 
capability, what purpose does their new carrier serve? First, a carrier will 
provide much needed air support to all aspects of fleet operations. Along h 
this idea, is the concept that the Soviet Union will not need to risk its own forces 
by entering confined waters when it can achieve air superiority above confined 
waters with carrier based aircraft. Second, aircraft carriers are forward 
deployed, rapidly mobile, and capable of offering an extensive range of 
escalation characteristics. An aircraft carrier provides an excellent platform 
from which to conduct crises response. Finally, the sheer impressiveness of an 
aircraft carrier will bolster naval presence and deterrence missions.
The interdiction of Western sea lines of communication (SLOCs) has 
always been an important mission of the Red Navy. The Soviets will no doubt 
target surface combrtants, bases, ports, maritime choke points, shipyards, and 
allied shipping. In addition logistics and facility destruction, SLOC interdiction 
is the primary method by which the Soviets will attempt to achieve the sea denial 
of Western forces.1
The Soviets intend to use a variety of weapon platforms to accomplish this 
mission. Coastal and geographic lines of communication could be prosecuted via 
the Strategic Rocket Forces, long range aviation, and surface forces. SLOC 
interdiction at sea woula be primarily conducted with the use of cruise missiles 
launched from Soviet fast attack submarines. The Red Navy will also use naval 
aviation, and mine warfare to assault high-seas SLOCs.2
1 Richard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction" in The Soviet N a vy , p. 162.
2 IBID., p. 163.
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Soviet SSN’s pose the largest threat to maritime shipping. Soviet 
submarines would close to just within the maximum range of their cruise missiles 
awaiting targeting information from the Soviet ocean surveillance system. The 
Soviets would use their Mike, Sierra, Echo, Charlie, Akula, and Alfa class 
submarines to accomplish this mission.1 The newer Akula, Mike, and Sierra 
subs are equipped with the SS-N-21. This missile has an effective rage of about 
1100 NM. The older Charlie, Echo, and Oscar class submarines are equipped 
with the SS-N-12 cruise missile which has an approximate range of 300 NM.2 
These extended ranges allow Soviet SSNs attack NATO SLOCs from great 
distances; thereby, increasing the survivability of its forces.
The Soviets will also use their naval aircraft to prosecute enemy SLOCs. 
In midocean operating areas, air-strikes would be used in conjunction with sea 
forces to disrupt enemy shipping. In continental theatres of operation, aviation 
would be used to mine ports, attack straits, and support the Naval Infantry.* 3 The 
Soviets will primarily depend upon the use of Backfire, Blackjack, and Badger 
aircraft to accomplish these missions.4
The limitation to Soviet Naval Aviation is the lack of adequate air 
protection. If Soviet bombers venture outside the range of land-based fighter 
cover, they are sitting ducks for Western aircraft. The introduction of the new 
Soviet carrier is a significant step in providing air cover to long range naval 
aircraft.5
1 IBID.~
11ones' Fighting Ships 1988-1989 (NY, NY: JFS Publishing Company, 1988), p. 5S4.
3 Richard Fisher, "Soviet SLOC Interdiction" in The Soviet N a vy , p. 164.
4 IBID.—
3 IB ID .-
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The third asset the Soviets the Red Navy will employ to disrupt Western 
SLOCs will be its surface fleet. Surface combatants will use cruise missiles to 
defeat enemy SLOCs. Initially, the surface fleet, in cooperation with air and sub 
assets, will attack the enemy forces which block submarine access to the open 
ocean.1
The primary way, however, in which the Soviet surface fleet will 
contribute to SLOC interdiction will be by the use of its amphibious fleet and 
Naval Infantry. The Soviets will land troops and provide NGFS in strategic 
geographical areas and ports to insure the free passage of Soviet vessels.2
One of the most significant threats to Western SLOCs will be provided by 
the Soviet use of mine warfare. The Soviets have dedicated a large amount of 
resources to mine warfare. Many classes of Soviet aircraft, surface ships, and 
submarines are capable of deploying mines.3
Mines could effectively be used in the Soviet sea denial strategy. The Red 
Navy could lay mines in strategic Western ports, known Western operating areas, 
and strategic geographical locations.
The Soviet Navy is aware of the of the extreme dependence NATO has on 
its SLOCs to provide logistics support in the event of large scale hostilities. 
During the Vietnam War, for example, 95% of all US military caigo arrived by 
way of sea transport.4 The Western SLOCs are the most vulnerable area of the 
US military and the Soviets know it.
1 IBID., p. 165.
2 IB ID .-
3 IBID.»
4 John D. Chase, “US Merchant Marine for Commerce and Defense," cited in “Soviet SLOC 
Interdiction,” by Richard Fisher.
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The use of the Red Navy to support to support Soviet political and military
interests by the use of naval presence is the final minion of the Soviet Navy.
Today Soviet vessels are deployed throughout the world in support of state
policy. In 1988 alone, the Soviets conducted over 40 port visits to foreign
nations.1 As Oliver Cromwell said, “A man of war is the best ambassador.”2
The US Department of Defense considers the Soviet idea of naval ‘peaceful
presence’ as, “asserting Soviet rights in international waters, protecting Soviet
merchant and fishing fleet interests, showing support for Soviet client states, and
counterbalancing Western naval presence.”3
The most important area, however, in which the Soviet fleet is able to
maintain Soviet interests throughout the globe is by its crises response capability.
After 1956, the Soviet Union had the ability to deploy its naval assets in a
crisis. The method of crisis deployment has been quite well planned and
methodical. For example, the Soviets did not send the Navy to interdict in
situations such as the Suez Crisis of 56 and the Lebanon Crisis of of 58 because
the Soviet Union, at that time, did not possess adequate surface capabilities. It
did not send naval forces to Vietnam because of the overwhelming superiority of
US forces in the area. Again, in Iran in 1979 and in the Falklands War of 1982
no forces were deployed because of the fact that Soviet naval presence in the area
would have gained nothing for the USSR.
There are a number of noteworthy features to Soviet naval crisis response.
First, they are always credible in that 
sufficient force is marshalled either 
to counter US naval ships on the scene, 
or to establish a dominant position should 
the US choose not to respond. Second, the
1 Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p.75.
2 Oliver Cromwell quoted in The Soviet Navy edited by Watson, Bruce W. and Watson, Susan 
M. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 265.
3 Chief of Naval Operations, Understanding Soviet Naval Developments, p.75.
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mission of a Soviet Naval crises response 
force has never exceeded its capabilities.
Third, as the USSR’s naval capabilities have 
expanded over the yea s, that country's 
reactions have become even more ambitious.1
The Soviet Navy used this capability during the Arab-Israeli war. The 
Soviets deployed more than 70 ships into the Mediterranean as a show of 
solidarity toward Egypt. This eventually led to the Soviets gamering an ally with 
Egypt in the late 1960’s.2 The 1970 Jordanian crisis saw the Soviet Navy send 49 
ships to counter the US carrier battle-group in the Med. Again in 1973, as a 
reaction to the Arab-Israeli War, the Red Navy sent an unprecedented nighty- 
five ships into the Med to counter the US force. For the first time in history, the 
US and Soviet fleets were evenly matched in the Mediterranean. In the Angolan 
Civil War, 1975 - 76, in a move to protect its shipping operations, the USSR 
stationed seven ships off the coast of Western Africa. Finally during the 
bthiopian-Somali war of 77-78, the Indian Ocean Squadron was bolstered by 
eleven extra ships. Their mission was to establish sea control in the Southern Red 
Sea in order to protect Soviet arms shipment to the area.3
It is in the area of crisis response that the Soviet Union has found an 
extremely important use for its peacetime fleet. We can look to the Soviet Union 
to increase the use of its fleet in support of state policy in the future.
1 Brian Larson, “Soviet Naval Responses to Crises,” The Soviet Navy edited by Watson, Bruce 
W. and Watson, Susan M. (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1986), p. 255-256.
2 IBID .-
3 IB ID .-
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The missions of the Soviet Navy are primarily defensive in nature. It is 
only able to effectively project its power in areas under the direct protection of 
Soviet aircraft. It is forced to conduct peripheral operations against the US fleet 
in hopes of not allowing the US to gain sea control. The Soviet Navy cannot 
directly confront the United States Navy and achieve sea control. The Soviet 
navy is designed for sea-denial; whereas the US Navy is intended for power 
projection.1 The use of its fleet in peacetime for diplomacy, and in a crisis 
response mode is expected of it as a super-power. They are not necessarily signs 
o f  i t s  “ n a v a l - m i n d e d n e s s . ”
1 Norman Friedman, “A Carrier for the Soviet Navy,” in The Future o f the Soviet Navy, 
(Boulder, CO:Westview Press, 1986), edited by Bruce W. Watson & Peter M. Dunn, p. 19.
VII. Conclusion
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In conclusion, we have seen that the Navy of the Soviet Union is limited by 
its modest heritage, limited power projection capability, and defensive mindset. 
The Soviet Navy owes its existence not to the imperatives of survival, but, rather, 
to the determination of a few strong-willed leaders. She is, however, a world 
class navy capable of challenging the West on the high-seas. As fleet Admiral 
Gorshkov said, “The flag of the Soviet Navy flies over the oceans of the world. 
Sooner or later the United States will have to realize it no longer has mastery of 
the seas.”1
1 Sergei 0. Gorshkov, Sea Power of the State
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